Even if a ceasefire happened today, normal shipping and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz would not return until late 2026 at the earliest—and more likely into early 2027. Shippers who are planning around a near-term resolution are building on a foundation that does not exist. Transportation consultant Thomas Witt has been tracking the Hormuz situation since it began in late February, and the most important thing shippers need to understand right now is this: the recovery timeline is measured in quarters, not weeks.

Read the full May 2026 energy outlook from the U.S. Energy Information Administration here.

What the Official Forecasts Are Actually Saying

The numbers from the major energy agencies are sobering and worth reading plainly. The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s May 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook assumes the Strait of Hormuz will remain effectively closed through late May, with flows slowly starting to resume in late May or early June—but even after flows resume, it will take until late 2026 or early 2027 for most pre-conflict production and commerce patterns to resume. Some producers around the Persian Gulf are not expected to return to pre-conflict production levels within the current forecast period at all.

The IEA’s assessment of LNG specifically is worse. Damage to LNG liquefaction infrastructure in Qatar is set to reduce projected supply growth and delay the anticipated global LNG expansion wave by at least two years, with the combined effect of short-term supply losses and slower capacity growth potentially resulting in a cumulative loss of around 120 billion cubic metres of LNG supply between 2026 and 2030. Tight LNG markets are not a 2026 problem—they extend well into 2027.

Where Things Stand Right Now

The situation has not stabilized. Traffic through Hormuz has run at approximately 5% of its pre-war average across April, with over 1,550 commercial vessels abandoned and 22,500 mariners trapped in and around the strait as of early May. Traffic collapsed from a pre-war average of 135 ships per day to roughly 26 over a recent 48-hour window, with Iran reportedly demanding as much as $2 million for safe passage.

Production shutdowns are deepening, not easing. Production shut-ins averaged 10.5 million barrels per day in April and are expected to peak at nearly 10.8 million barrels per day in May as storage levels reach maximum capacity, forcing producers to shut in wells. Iraq and Kuwait were already curtailing production in early March when storage first started filling. That problem has only grown since.

On top of Hormuz, the Red Sea remains closed. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed and Houthi forces having simultaneously resumed attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, the Suez Canal route is equally unviable — leaving the Cape of Good Hope as the only realistic option for most carriers, adding approximately 3,500 to 4,000 nautical miles and 10 to 14 additional days to voyage times on Asia-to-Europe lanes.

What the Recovery Actually Looks Like

Even once the conflict subsides, the restart is not a switch that flips back on. Approximately 70% of lost production could return within three months of the Strait reopening, rising to roughly 88% by the six-month mark — but Iran and Iraq face structurally more complex restarts due to low reservoir pressure in key fields, and Iran faces the additional constraint of sanctions exposure that complicates access to specialist equipment and project financing.

In other words, even a best-case reopening leaves a significant production and shipping gap for months afterward. The EIA isn’t forecasting a snap-back—it’s forecasting a slow, uneven recovery with meaningful uncertainty on the downside.

What This Means for Supply Chain Planning Right Now

Thomas Witt is direct on this point: the single most damaging planning assumption a shipper can make right now is that this resolves quickly. It won’t. Building Q3 and Q4 plans around a normalized Hormuz environment is a significant risk.

A few things worth acting on immediately. Extended Cape of Good Hope rerouting is the operational baseline—budget for it, schedule around it, and stop treating it as a temporary workaround. Fuel surcharges are not coming down anytime soon; with production shut-ins at nearly 11 million barrels per day and Brent averaging well above $100 per barrel, the freight cost environment will remain elevated through the year. LNG-dependent supply chains need contingency sourcing identified now, not when the shortage becomes critical. And for any shipments that were relying on Persian Gulf port access—Jebel Ali, Dammam, Khalifa— alternative routing decisions cannot wait.

The businesses that will navigate the rest of 2026 most effectively are the ones treating the recovery timeline as a serious planning constraint, not a news cycle to wait out.